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PREFACE
Although 40 years ago the average Indian enjoyed a living standard significantly
higher than the average Chinese, since then China has only on rare occasions looked to
India for development lessons. The development of the software industry is one such
instance. Here, India has enjoyed remarkable success over the last decade and a half in
building a world-class software industry whose exports are currently running at around
$10 billion, making it one of India’s leading foreign exchange earners.
Perhaps ironically, it is the Indians who are looking over their shoulders, worrying
that, now that the Chinese government has set its sights on this sector, India’s dominant
position is under threat. How real is the threat? Could China conversely offer Indian
software companies attractive opportunities for partnership and co-operation?
To explore the prospects for Indian and Asian software industry and its
contribution to broad-based economic development, the OECD Development Centre, in
co-operation with the State Government of Tamil Nadu and the Union Government of
India, held an international conference on 11-12 November 2002 in Chennai, India. The
conference completed the Centre’s 2001-2002 Programme of Work on “Globalising
Technologies and Domestic Entrepreneurship in Developing Countries”.
This paper from the Chennai conference, by Ted Tschang of Singapore
Management University and ADBI, examines the characteristic strengths and
weaknesses of China’s fledgling software industry, comparing and contrasting it with
those of the Indian industry. The clearest differences between the two are: i) the Chinese
industry’s domestic market orientation versus India’s export orientation; ii) China’s
emphasis on product packages versus India’s emphasis on services. The two differences
are interrelated inasmuch as China’s product-oriented firms would have faced daunting
challenges penetrating major export markets in head-to-head competition with the likes
of Microsoft, while India’s firms have been able to thrive in OECD markets precisely by
eschewing products and concentrating on honing their process and project management
skills. In future, as China seeks to become an international software power, it will need to
master that same skill set, for which strategic alliances with Indian software firms could
prove valuable.
Jorge Braga de Macedo
President
OECD Development Centre
18 February 2003
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RÉSUMÉ
L’industrie de logiciels de la Chine est modeste et sous-développée, comparée à
son industrie des matériels informatiques, et à l’industrie indienne de logiciels. Toutefois
le statut actuel n’est pas nécessairement un bon indice pour mesurer les perspectives
d’avenir de la Chine, si l’on s’en réfère à son histoire récente. Ce qui différencie la Chine
de l’Inde dans le secteur des logiciels est que la première a établi des liens étroits avec
les utilisateurs nationaux, notamment les utilisateurs industriels et commerciaux,
développant ainsi l’apprentissage intensif en matière de développement de produits à
grande échelle pour un marché national déjà important et sans cesse croissant.
L’industrie de logiciels de l’Inde, manquant d’un secteur d’utilisateurs aussi dynamique
qu’en Chine, s’est développée en exportant ses logiciels.
Ce sous-développement du marché national constitue-t-il un handicap à long
terme pour l’Inde vis-à-vis de la Chine ? Pas nécessairement, si les entreprises
indiennes se servent de leurs propres forces en matière de contrôle des processus de
production et de gestion des projets, et éventuellement en forgeant des alliances avec
des entreprises chinoises dont le point fort est le développement de produits et
possédant une clientèle domestique avertie ; ces alliances étant un moyen de pénétrer
un marché régional de plus en plus important. Que de telles alliances tactiques puissent
évoluer en alliances d’autant plus stratégiques, des joint-ventures sino-indiennes entrant
en concurrence avec des multinationales sur des niches du marché mondial, reste
toutefois, une question purement spéculative.
Certaines politiques et institutions chinoises — notamment la recherche publique
en matière de logiciels en langue chinoise, moteurs de traduction, systèmes de sécurité,
etc. — semblent avoir généré un nombre significatif d’avantages supplémentaires, dans
certains cas en tant que dérivés de matériel informatique provenant de laboratoires de
recherches gouvernementaux. Alors que l’industrie de logiciels de l’Inde repose, en
matière de capital humain, sur l’élite de ses instituts régionaux de technologie, il
semblerait qu’elle ne dispose pas d’un soutien public en R&D sur les logiciels innovants
comparable à celui de la Chine. Elle le devrait peut-être et cela reste une question
importante à aborder.
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SUMMARY
The Chinese software industry is small and underdeveloped, compared with its
computer and other information technology (IT) hardware industry and compared with
India’s software industry. Yet, current status is not necessarily a good guide to future
prospects, as China’s recent history amply demonstrates. An important difference
between the Chinese and Indian software sectors is the former’s close links to domestic
users, notably industrial and commercial users. This has fostered intensive learning in
the area of product development for a large and rapidly growing domestic market. India’s
software sector, lacking such a dynamic domestic user sector until very recently, has
thrived on exporting software services.
Does the underdeveloped domestic user base constitute a long-term liability for
India vis-à-vis China? Not necessarily, if Indian firms can play to their own strengths in
process control and project management, perhaps forging alliances with Chinese
companies strong in product development and with a sophisticated domestic customer
base as a means of penetrating an increasingly important regional market. Whether such
tactical alliances could evolve into something more strategic, with Indian-Chinese joint
venture companies competing with multinationals in certain global market niches
remains, however, a question of speculation.
Certain Chinese government policies and institutions — notably, publicly financed
research into Chinese language software, translation engines, security systems, etc. —
appear to have generated a significant number of software spin offs, in some cases as
derivatives of hardware by products from government research laboratories. While
India’s software industry relies heavily for its human capital on the elite regional institutes
of technology, it would seem to have no counterpart to China’s public R&D support for
innovative software products. Perhaps it should and that remains an important question
to be addressed.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the broad characteristics of China’s software industry and its
implications for India’s growth and strategy in the region. Although the Chinese software
industry is only a recent phenomenon, it has often been compared to that of India. As
such, it has been considered by observers in India and elsewhere possibly to be either a
prospective threat to India’s software exports1, or an opportunity for India. Although
China’s hardware manufacturing industry is better known in the world, software has
become an official part of the strategy for new industrial development. The Chinese
software sector will also have interesting implications for the kinds of alternative paths to
development that may be taken in other countries, both in their own right and in their
interactions with India’s software industry.
There are many peculiarities to China’s software industry which suggest that it
may be quite different from India’s. In particular, it has somewhat different beginnings,
and a distinct structure and role in the economy quite different from India’s mainly export
services-driven software industry. Whereas India’s domestic products market is largely
dominated by multinationals, China’s domestic firms hold about 33 per cent of the
market, with official policy being to increase this to 60 per cent in ten years (Gartner,
2002)2.
Consequently, a large part of China’s industry could follow a different path from
India’s. This different path has implications for India’s industry as it positions itself to take
advantages of the opportunities in China.
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II. HISTORY OF THE CHINESE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
The strength of the Chinese software industry comes in part from the huge market
of users and domestic producers, and this is fuelling the need for software of all kinds,
including products. There is a conventional belief among industry watchers and
government alike that the industry is largely made up of smaller, weaker firms, and that
there is a need to grow larger firms. Part of this perceived weakness comes from the
process capabilities, which are believed to be poorer than India’s. Poor domestic
software process capabilities were cited by Huawei, a large Chinese telecoms firm, as a
reason why it located a major software development facility in Bangalore, India. Rampant
software piracy and high employee turnover could also be two factors that contribute to
the small size and relative weakness of China’s software firms.
In other research, we point out that some of this conventional wisdom is not quite
right (Tschang and Xue, forthcoming)3. For instance, the fact that the Chinese software
firms are small does not necessarily connote weakness. In particular, the product-
oriented firms that have attained a medium size and sufficient branding are doing quite
well. The size and unevenness of the market presents many challenges to Chinese
firms, and particularly to overseas entrants attempting to enter the market.
The Chinese software industry is also benefiting from its hardware industry, in that
the need of domestic manufacturers for embedded software provides advantages to
domestic software producers. This point has been discussed previously by others who
believe that one strategy for growth would be to focus on software for the domestic
sector (Heeks, 1999). This path was followed some time ago by Brazil (Schware, 1992),
which had a relatively strong domestic industrial position not unlike China’s.
Origins of the Chinese IT Industry
The Early Hardware Industry
The origins of the Chinese software industry are partly connected with that of the
broader IT industry, especially the PC industry, and indeed, some of their origins are
similar. As such, it is worthwhile reviewing what we know of the broader IT industry.
The earliest and most well-known IT companies have their origins in a variety of
sources, with the more technology intensive ones coming from various government
research institutes, universities, and “green field” start ups. Four important modes of IT
industry firm formation have been identified by Lu (2000) and form much of the basis for
the brief analysis in this section:
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1) The model of spin offs from the government-funded research institutes in the
Chinese Academy of Sciences — as represented by Legend, a PC language card
maker that became a full-fledged PC manufacturer.
2) The model of university-researched technologies being commercialised by private
enterprises which were funded partly by the university and partly by other agents
— as represented by Founder, which made its start by developing electronic
publishing systems but is now also a major PC manufacturer.
3) The model of spin offs from a state run firm — represented by Great Wall, a PC
manufacturer.
4) The model of a green field start up — represented by Stone Group Corporation, a
company that was started by university graduates and whose first products were
word processing products.
A few well-known Chinese hardware firms made an earlier start as spin offs from
universities, usually as a result of some combination of software and hardware
technology. These in turn have given rise to software divisions, or even software spin
offs. A case in point is the well-known PC maker Founder, which had roots in Beijing
University research on font processing and pictographic publishing systems. Founder
illustrates how the combination of government supported research, coupled with private
sector investment and entrepreneurship, succeeded in the creation of what became a
leading PC maker (Lu, 2000).
The other model is that of Legend, which started with a number of professors
leaving the CAS Institute of Computing Technology, eventually to shape another leading
PC brand (Lu, 2000, p. 63). Legend came about because government investments in
research on Chinese language processing gave the CAS team an important
technological edge, which was translated by the spin off into a specialised computer add-
on card, and eventually into PC manufacturing prowess.
Stone also got a start in the software-hardware nexus, but it did so by specifically
designing Chinese character software to be combined with a Japanese printer. Coupled
with cost advantages, the company was able to gain strong market share. Although
Stone was started as a Tsinghua University spin off, it also took advantage of talent from
the CAS, which was crucial to its products (Lu, 2000).
Influence of the Government
In all of the above models, the government has had a profound influence in its
provision of intellectual capital, training and incentives. The Chinese government has
assisted the hardware industry in more ways than one. Firstly, it helped realise the model
represented by Great Wall: that of allowing a state-run computer company (one of many)
to become privatised as a successful PC maker.
The Chinese government also had an early influence on the software and hardware
industries by its sponsorship of national research efforts on “core technologies” deemed
essential to the nation’s computer industry. Some examples include various large-scale
government-funded projects dedicated to developing Chinese competence in core
computer technologies, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology’s 863 research
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programme, and other government research projects that became the basis for Founder,
Legend and other companies. More recently, a series of government “Golden” projects
was started to expand the country’s e-commerce and infrastructure and various sectoral
applications, e.g. e-government (Lovelock et al., 1997).
Perhaps the government’s most important role comes through its support of
national research and development in the several dozen research institutes of the
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), a number of which also participated in the
development of these core software and hardware technologies.
It is reasonable to say that the research institutes served not only as a nurturing
ground for technology, but also as a holding area for scientific and engineering talent,
keeping them engaged until such time as private sector opportunity emerged. Otherwise
much of the scientific talent would have atrophied in unrelated pursuits. While
government-financed research often gave prospective entrepreneurs a competitive edge,
the companies were created and made successful largely by “private” efforts
(e.g. university entrepreneurs and private investments). It is worth reiterating that some
of the earliest and most well-known PC makers were based on some kind of technology
related to software.
Finally, another phenomenon commonly seen in China is the use of government
procurement, especially at regional and municipal level, to enable local firms to bid and
supply IT systems. This has been instrumental in many cities like Shanghai and regions
like Shandong. Many of the larger systems integrators like Wenda in Shanghai and Top
in Chengdu have benefited directly from these policies.
The Chinese government has also developed many of the same policies for the
software industry, but much support has been along the lines of infrastructure provision
(e.g. many provincial governments invest huge amounts of time and money in software
technology parks), incentives (e.g. recognition programmes), and provision of skills. In
this regard, the Chinese government appears to be trying to avoid getting into the
industry directly, and is simply seeking to foster the same basic conditions for industrial
formation suggested by the Indian experience.
The Software Industry’s Origins
In the earlier success stories discussed above, the issues of software and
hardware are intertwined, since many of them developed technologies that involved
some amount of software, often embedded in hardware.
We show elsewhere that, as in hardware, there is also a strong influence of
research institutes, government spin offs, and universities in the formation of the more
recent pure software firms (Tschang and Xue, forthcoming). Various institutes of the
Chinese Academy of Sciences, such as the Institute for Computing, the Software
Institute, and even the Institute for Natural Resources, have been the seedbed for a
number of start ups in the information security, operating systems and geographic
information systems areas respectively.
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The early hardware firms have also launched into software. The four models
described in Lu’s case studies are only representative of the best PC firms. Although the
early hardware firms had established themselves in the market for both personal
computers and highly specific types of software technologies, such as character
recognition, they did not have much capability in systems and application software. Over
the years, many have established software arms, such as the Legend Group, which
recently separated its software arm and renamed it Digital China. However, the
investigation of these firms can be complicated as some firms still keep a hand in
multiple activities such as software development and systems integration. This is done
partly because systems integration gives firms a chance to promote their software as
well as to make profits off hardware sales.
Another possible source of software firms is the systems integration business. The
rise of the hardware (i.e. PC) sector accompanied the increasing use of computers in
Chinese business and society. Along with this came a large number of firms dedicated to
systems integration, or the configuration and installation of hardware and software in
different custom arrangements for customers. This was in part due to the lack of
sophistication of customers, and was not unlike the early stages of US software
applications development, where firms had to build customised applications for small
customers.
Finally, we cannot ignore the new breed of software firm that, much like Stone in
the area of hardware, comes about largely through the actions of private individuals. With
the increase of venture capital in China, there have been increasing numbers of firms
formed by individuals of varying background.
Comparison of Origins with India
While the Indian software industry did have some roots in the defence industry,
especially around Bangalore, it is reasonable to say that it did not have the same level of
sustained overt government support as the Chinese IT industry. A number of Chinese
firms have been spun off from institutes and universities. There are a few parallels, such
as India’s Computer Maintenance Corporation, which started as a government subsidiary
and, in fact, has arguably done more than most firms in India to advance the overall
impacts of IT on the masses, with its public sector projects on the Indian railways
reservations system, and in many other semi-public projects since then.
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III. CURRENT STATUS OF CHINA’S SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
Characteristics of China’s Software Industry
Since China is a huge country with a diverse software industry, there are a
number of dimensions relevant to understanding the industry. We will examine the
following dimensions:
— the industrial structure and main characteristics of the industry;
— the human resources situation;
— the regional distribution of companies;
— firm size characteristics;
— the main activities, e.g. systems integration and packaged software, domestic
sales versus exports.
The Chinese software industry appears to be moving forward on many fronts.
Currently, the software industry represents already a fairly large proportion of the overall
computer industry, as shown in the table below, but still accounts for a very small proportion
of the country’s GDP.
Table 1. Output of Software, Computer Industry and Total GDP
Total GDPOutput of software
industry
(100 million yuan)
Output of
computer industry
(100 million yuan)
Software as proportion
of computer industry
(%) (100 million yuan)
Software as
proportion of
GDP (%)
1999 442 1 720 25.6 82 000 0.54
2000 593 2 150 27.6 89 000 0.67
Growth rate (%) 34 25 - 8.5 -
Source: CSIA (2000).
The growth rate of China’s software sector is still on average below that of India’s,
which at its zenith between 1999 and 2000, grew by 53 per cent (it has since dropped to
about 25 per cent between 2001 and 2002). This suggests that a different growth path is
at work for China, possibly one where firms have weaker capabilities or face market
conditions unlike those facing India’s export sector.
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Industrial Structure and Characteristics
The growth rate of different sectors is shown in the table below. The services
component is the largest in total sales, where services can range from outsourcing
computer services to systems integration. (Other types of services like maintenance and
customer service are also important to the industry.) Exports are low but are increasing
rapidly year on year.
The proportion of China’s software industry output that is export-based is only
about 5.6 per cent in 2000, versus about 70 per cent for India in 1998 (i.e. exports of
4 billion out of $5.7 billion) (NASSCOM, 2000). As noted earlier, the percentage of
China’s industry that is product-based is also quite high, accounting for about one third of
the total in 2000.
Table 2. The Industry Breakdown by Major Sector: Sales
[100 million yuan (about $12.5 million) and growth rate]
Software products Services Exports Total
1999 182 239 21 442
2000 238 322 33 593
Rate of growth (%) 31.8 35 57 34.3
Source: CSIA (2000), p. 2.
In 2000, of the total product sales of 23.8 billion yuan shown in the table,
packaged software products are reported to be about 1.5 billion yuan. This is an
underestimate, however, because it only represents direct sales of computer retailers,
which are estimated to be about 10 to 15 per cent of the actual total4. Of this packaged
software, about 65 per cent of the sales come from application products, 21 per cent
from supporting software and 14 per cent from system software. So in fact, software
products are likely to be a greater proportion of the software industry in China than the
table suggests.
The rate of growth of total software sales was an astronomical 330 per cent in
1992, but fell to a more modest rate of 34.3 per cent by 2000 (the latter is shown in
Table 2)5. This modest rate at this still early stage may not be so surprising, given that a
large part of China’s industrial demand for products is probably focused for the time
being on low value added or low cost products.
Table 3. Growth in Sales of Types of Products for Selected Years
(100 000 yuan)
1992 1996 2000
System software 1.6 8.5 33.2
Supporting software 5.4 20.0 49.6
Application software 12.8 63.5 155.0
Total 19.8 92.0 238.0
Rate of growth (%) 330 35 31
Source: CSIA (2000), p. 5.
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Focus on Products
The main difference between China and India appears to be the strong domestic
product focus of the Chinese industry (as opposed to providing export services, which is
the mainstay of India’s industry). A significant number of the firms known to have better
capabilities and business models are product-focused.
The Indian industry also has a domestic products segment, albeit one that is still a
smaller proportion of its industry than China’s and faces a smaller-sized market.
Although the role of multinationals in China should not be marginalised, thus far it
appears that, in contrast to India, multinationals have not had a great impact on domestic
Chinese firms, either in terms of employee experience or training, or by being clients for
the firms. The biggest impact appears to be in terms of competition at the high end of
products and services, with multinationals having secured about two-thirds of the
domestic products market.
Some aspects of the Chinese economy are expected to have positive influences
on the industry’s growth, such as the strong manufacturing sector, which uses software
in many products even beyond computer equipment, e.g. telecommunications equipment
(some of which is now 50 per cent comprised of software), consumer electronic products,
and automated machinery. There are about 20 million small- to medium-sized
enterprises in China, which provides a substantial business user base6. This base is
expected to increase the domestic (packaged) software market from $10 billion to
$100 billion in five to eight years (CSIA, 2000).
Furthermore, the proportion of the population with personal computers is ever
increasing, reaching nearly 29 million in 2000, and the proportion of mobile telephone
users has rapidly increased, reaching 145 million telephone users in 2000, of which
85.2 million were mobile users (Tan and Wu, 2002, citing various sources)7. This PC
market is so large that it could comfortably sustain the expansion of a number of
domestic manufacturers, with six of the largest vendors being Legend (9.1 per cent of PC
market revenue, based on revenue of $271 million for 235 535 shipments), Tonru
(4.9 per cent), Founder (2.9 per cent), Great Wall (2.2 per cent), and Langchao (1.2 per
cent) (Stone was also amongst the largest, but not tracked for this period) (Gartner,
1998). The low cost of Chinese PCs has caused US, Japanese and even Taiwanese
producers either to lose market share or be forced into local joint-venture operations.
Although the proportion of the PC user base is still small and has been said to be
holding back e-commerce, there appears to be enough critical mass of business and
household users to sustain a viable population of software firms. The question is whether
this population of firms (or some subset thereof) will continue to grow in size and
strength, perhaps with some consolidation, or whether they will remain small and weak
because of competitive dynamics, e.g. sustained downward pressure on costs with
resultant low quality.
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Human Resources
Table 4 shows that the total number of graduates in computer-related fields and
workers in the software industry is steadily growing. Other estimates put the pool of IT
professionals at about 150 000 in China for 2001, versus about 522 000 in India, based
on graduates of 50 000 and 73 218 per year respectively, and a total demand of 350 000
and 400 000 respectively (Gartner, 2002). Like India, China also suffers an outward
migration of graduates to the US and elsewhere.
In recognition of the low number of graduates, the national and local governments
are instituting large-scale plans, such as the designation of 35 universities nationwide for
national software engineering programmes. Cities like Shanghai and Jinan are actively
developing software engineering curricula and enlarging existing institutions to feed their
growing local industries.
Table 4. Software Workforce
Year Number of software professionals Number of graduates in computers and software
1998 132 000 29 000
1999 150 000 33 000
2000 186 000 41 000
Source: CSIA (2000), p. 12.
Despite the slow growth of software professionals, there did not appear to be
major shortages of most types of personnel in the firms that we interviewed in Tschang
and Xue (forthcoming). A greater problem could be posed by the skills of the workforce.
Only about 10 per cent of the IT workforce has experience with complex programming
tasks, and project management ability continues to lag behind India’s8.
Because of the shortage of skills in China, the hourly wage rates for professionals
(i.e. developers with about two years experience) can range widely, from about $12 to
$25 in China, versus about $24 in India (Gartner, 2002)9. While these numbers in both
China and India are debatable, the wider range in China reflects the uneven nature of the
Chinese labour market. Some professionals will be paid higher than others, depending
on their experience, the company’s ability to pay, and widely differing compensation
packages, which can sometimes include housing and cars.
Regional Dispersion of Industry
The regional picture is also enlightening. The table below shows key statistics for
the top seven regions (as measured by the number of companies, but many are also at
the top in terms of the number of employees and other statistics), and the total for
25 regions (excluding Beijing, which has a very large number of firms).
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Table 5. Key Characteristics of Major Software Producing Districts
Industrial
District
Number of
companies
Number of
people / district
Sales
(100 million yuan)
Product Sales
(100 million yuan)
Service Sales
(100 million yuan)
Exports
($10 000)
Guangdong 1 500 40 000 135 47 78 122
Shanghai 600 12 637 48 12 12 7 276
Liaoning 600 15 000 40 25 12 -
Shaanxi 500 6 000 32 - - -
Jiangsu 2 000 12 900 25 15 10 -
Shenzhen 600 23 000 23 14 - 1 250
Shangdong 540 30 000 21 12 10 -
Total
(25 districts) 8 682 184 622 474 155 131 17 009
Source: CSIA (2000), pp. 6-7.
Beijing is by far the largest software producing district, with a balanced industry
including packaged, industrial, and security software, as well as exports. Beijing’s
prominence is in part due to its being a centre for government and leading educational
and research institutions, as well as the base for a number of well-known computer firms.
The software industry in Beijing is located in the Zhongguancuan area of Haidian district,
which has two of the leading universities in Beijing University and Tsinghua University,
as well as headquarters and large facilities of a number of important early IT companies,
such as Founder.
Shanghai has fewer companies but is a leading centre for overseas investment,
finance, and high-tech industries, including electronics and semiconductors. The
infrastructure, universities and government support in Shanghai are also very strong.
However, it is a puzzling fact that, despite these advantages, Shanghai is still not known
for any sizeable software companies, other than systems integrators. However, it is quite
likely that the Shanghai region will do better at integrating services with other sectors
such as finance and manufacturing, as well as consulting, given its better facility with
English and exposure to foreign investors.
Finally, Xian, the leading industrial centre for the western part of China, is also
mounting a strong software push. Xian’s policy is focused on the export services market,
with an apparent emphasis on the Japanese market. There are also some domestic
product companies. Jinan (in Shandong province) has been a centre for heavy industry,
and it is developing a number of companies focused on industrial applications.
Other regions with heavy concentrations of high tech also have heavy
concentrations of software firms, e.g. Shenzhen near Hong Kong (where Huawei is
headquartered) and Guangdong in the southern coastal area. However, the software
activity appears to be quite dispersed across the country, and some cities like Chengdu
in Sichuan province that do not even have large numbers of firms may have at least one
large well-known software firm.
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Firm Size
According to the CSIA, there are about 5 700 software producers in the country
(out of the more than 10 000 firms dealing with software), but of the 5 700 firms, only
about 50 have above 1 000 employees, and 70 per cent have fewer than 50 employees.
About 30 per cent are government-owned, 60 per cent are private, and the remaining
10 per cent are of mixed parentage.
The average of 21 employees per firm in Table 5 shows that there are many small
companies in the software industry. Furthermore, there is a great degree of variation,
e.g. the hardware producing districts such as Guangdong and Shenzhen and heavy
industrial region of Shangdong have much larger numbers of people, and larger numbers
of employees per firm than the other districts. This suggests that some districts have
differing technological capability and type of activity, with some such as Guangdong
having firms that are actually lower value added, e.g. based on systems integration and
other low-end services.
The top 69 Chinese software firms comprise about 25 700 million yuan in sales,
which is under half of the total output of the software industry. This contrasts with India,
where in 1998-99, the top 25 firms accounted for nearly two-thirds of software export
revenues.
Not surprisingly, when ranked by sales, the top Chinese software firms are
dwarfed by the top Indian ones. Their relative sizes as ranked by number of employees
are also quite different: the largest pure software companies in China such as Top and
ChongRan have about 2 000 to 3 000 employees, while a number of Indian companies
already have upwards of ten thousand employees. The Chinese numbers also include a
number of firms that do more lower value added work like systems integration.
Table 6. Comparison of Revenues for Top 10 Indian and Chinese Software Companies
(in dollars using estimated exchange rates of 48 rupees = 1 dollar; 8 yuan = 1 dollar)
Top Indian companies Approximately FY 02 sales Top Chinese companies Approximately FY 00 sales
(in sales) ($ million) (in sales) ($ million)
TCS 809 Founder 438
Infosys 532 PuTian 186
Wipro 479 Legend 175
Satyam 355 DongFang 134
HCK 275 ChongRan 126
Patni 153 ChangTian 125
Silverline 126 TsingHua DongFang 115
Mahindra 113 YianTai 107
Pentasoft 96 CVIC 94
HCL Perot 94 Top 93
Sources: NASSCOM (www.nasscom.org); CSIA (2000).
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The Chinese software industry is perceived by many observers, including the
national government, to consist of too many (undesirably) small companies. In part, the
smaller size of Chinese software firms is due to their early stage of growth and the fact
that they have not yet mastered the art of managing growth in technical capability,
process, project size and numbers of projects.
The conventional belief also suggests that many smaller firms are not growing,
i.e. are not making much money. In part, this small size may be due to the recentness of
the industry’s development. Many firms interviewed in Tschang and Xue (forthcoming) have
only existed for a few years, whereas many of the largest Indian companies have been
around for two decades, and have only reached their currently large sizes through steady
growth followed by a growth spurt in the 1990s. Furthermore, China’s software industry has
largely focused on domestic markets, which may act as a further constraint on its size.
Alleviating Confusion: Definitions of Products versus Services
A discussion of the software firms and concentrations of firms across the country
can obscure some not so obvious details. Many of the largest firms are doing either
systems integration, or a combination of products and systems integration. This
translates to regional differences as well. According to this classification, of the 13 largest
firms in Shanghai (those above 100 million yuan in revenue), nine are systems
integrators (i.e. doing a lower value added kind of work), while Beijing has only five out of
its 17 firms in systems integration, the rest being either in products or some mixture of
systems integration and products. This suggests a lower level of capability at least in
these particular Shanghai firms.
Clearly, the differences between products and services like systems integration
(and mixtures of the two) will have to be defined better in order better to analyse the
Chinese software situation as a whole, as well as to measure the capabilities of the firms.
Some product work resembles services more than packaged products, since it may
involve making just a few “copies” or versions of a product, but it would not be termed
systems integration. We call these “customisable products”. Some products like certain
firms’ enterprise resource planning software packages have to be 50 per cent
customised. This will depend on the level of sophistication of the customer, and the
degree to which specifications have to be changed for each customer.
Customisable products may involve a higher level of firm autonomy than is typical
in export services, i.e. the software developer may have to do higher end work with
greater responsibility, e.g. the requirements analysis and initial high level design
stages10, and the ownership of the intellectual property allows the developer to make
customised copies for additional customers.
Thus, since some of the “product” work that firms claim to be doing is done on a
custom basis and charged on a project basis, and thus is not even close to being
development of “packaged products” with brand names, the outputs are more
appropriately called customisable products or even services. Furthermore, at this early
stage of the industry, when branding is still a problem for many firms, customised
products may be a more effective strategy to promote their capabilities.
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The notion of services also varies widely, to include everything from systems
integration to “IT solutions” and export services. In terms of export services, as in India,
Chinese export services can also embody a wide range of activities, from work that is
just utilising programming talent, to work requiring partial product development activities
(since sometimes requirements analysis or systems design are not outsourced to the
service company).
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III. COMPARING CAPABILITY OF CHINESE AND INDIAN SOFTWARE
FIRMS
As a first step to examining the possible ways in which Indian and Chinese
software expertise might interact, we examine their respective levels of capability.
Knowing this will give a first approximation for determining whether complementary areas
of expertise have emerged, and whether these can be shared or learned.
Capability can be measured by different dimensions such as:
— individual technical skills;
— process maturity;
— management capability;
— technology;
— revenue model;
— product marketing capability.
We consider each in turn.
Individual Technical Skills
As in India, individual technical skills are quite good in China. Chinese
programmers from universities such as Tsinghua University in Beijing have been placed
in the top ranks in international programming contests. The problem is that without
practical and systems knowledge (such as software engineering processes), or
experience for that matter, Chinese programmers will continue to be at a disadvantage.
Process Maturity
On the whole, most Chinese firms are not at a high enough level of process
maturity to compete with Indian firms. The main benchmark for measuring software
process maturity is the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model
(CMM). Whereas at the high end, India has about 32 firms that have reached level 5, the
highest level, China only has one thus far (Gartner, 2002). A much longer road lies
ahead for firms planning to upgrade their process maturity, especially since attainment of
level 5 requires demonstration of substantial organisational capability.
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It is well known that Indian firms are making significant strides in their process
capabilities. For instance, Infosys’ knowledge management practices are becoming
renowned, as is Wipro’s technical and management expertise. Other companies such as
Ramco have developed in-house process platforms to increase productivity and flexibility
of their software development. While these are issues that many Chinese firms have not
even considered yet, the question remains whether these process capabilities are
somewhat static in nature once they are achieved, or whether further evolution in
capabilities can keep India ahead.
Management
While in the past, India did not have enough systems analysts and other middle-
level management personnel, it appears likely that with the reduced pace of growth in
recent years, and the return of thousands of Indian software professionals as a result of
the US economic downturn, many Indian firms should have been able to overcome their
difficulties by now. Chinese firms by contrast are still having some trouble in upgrading
their management techniques. Eventually, they may have to find a different way of
managing that can blend the best of international practices with local traditional
situations. Certainly, the invitation of many Indians to lecture on software process in
China, coupled with the opening of training institutes such as India’s NIIT training centres
in China, will help speed up that process of exposure.
Technology
Technology appears to be one of the most important competitive advantages that
distinguish the strong firms from the weak. We define technology in this case to be
technology created by strong research achievements or capabilities. Examples of
Chinese technology-relevant public research expertise can be found in the operating
systems and security areas, where companies have benefited by getting their technology
from close association with universities and the CAS institutes.
The origins of the more product-focused Chinese companies appear to contrast
with the types of technology learnt in India, where much of the technology was learnt
through technology transfer from multinationals or acquired from the open market
(e.g. programming languages). The Indian firms, however, have managed to cultivate
this into a base of expertise on the latest software technologies, including Java-based
components and Microsoft’s proprietary platforms.
The Indian firms have also shown themselves to be capable of making products.
The major software service exporters including Infosys, Satyam, and Wipro have each
launched one or more products. However, these have either not been successful or have
had a limited impact in markets. It has only been the medium-sized (now larger) product-
focused companies like I-Flex and Ramco that have really tried to make a living off
products in the international market, also with mixed results.
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Revenue Model: Mix of Product and Service Capabilities
The revenue model has implications for how a company can sustain its growth.
While some Chinese product-focused firms have managed to grow, as with the medium-
sized companies in India such as Ramco, other Chinese firms have found it difficult to
grow by products alone. In such situations, Chinese firms have tried to combine product
sales in systems integration solutions. This is not unlike what Indian product firms did in
using export services to fund their product development efforts.
Product Marketing Capability
China’s markets for software in different provinces are quite fragmented and
difficult to break into, given the different standards across provinces (and even across
industrial sectors). Existing relationships between firms local to those provinces and their
customers or institutions may also form barriers to entry for other firms. In order to
market and expand nationally, software firms have had to adopt different techniques in
these conditions. There appear to be at least two ways to market products in China:
through product branding, and through relationship sales (sales through affiliates, agents
or even systems integrators). Some Chinese product firms have managed to establish
themselves with strong domestic brands in specific sectors. Those that have not rely
mainly on the latter marketing method.
Capability as a Differentiator in the Marketplace
The deepening of technological or other forms of capability is one way in which
stronger companies differentiate themselves from their weaker rivals. There are many
small, weak companies in China which compete on cost alone, and in a competitive
market, these can make it difficult for the better companies to climb out of the pack.
Some firms have tried to move to more technologically-sophisticated products at the
higher end, so as not to compete with the many smaller companies who could not
compete at that level, but this can prove difficult without the right skilled manpower
(e.g. properly trained software engineers) or if the market does not support the move
(e.g. customers expecting cheap products with lots of free customer service).
DEV/DOC(2003)03
25
IV. ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE INDIAN
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
To summarise the previous discussion, the Chinese and Indian software industries
have the following capabilities listed in the table. Each of the above elements in the table
is generalised from the firms that we have interviewed in past research (and for some
elements, just a few firms). The table supports the observation that India is strongest in
its process capabilities and management, while some Chinese firms are strong in their
research, or strong in the branding of their products.
Table 7. Comparing Different Types of Capabilities in China and India
Aspect of Capability China India
Software Process
Capability
Weak at individual and
organisational level (relative to
India).
Strong in software process, continually climbing
the value chain.
Management Weak management in many firms
(relative to India).
Strong management in top firms.
Technology Strong lab research in institutions,
strong linkages between universities
and firms.
Weak in university-based research and links
between universities and firms, strong in
commercial technology (partly from multinational
clients).
Revenue Model Product sales, with systems
integration as additional revenue
generator.
For product firms, services are used to sustain
product development.
Individual Technical Skills Strong. Strong.
Product Marketing Strong local product branding. (Product) branding is immaterial to service firms.
Weak marketing capabilities. Weak marketing capabilities.
Gartner and other commentators have suggested that this devolves to a very
straightforward proposition: that Chinese skilled labour and management is going to be
even scarcer than India’s, and so India should send its higher level people to China to
help manage and develop the upgrading of Chinese capabilities. Another proposition that
follows is that Indian firms could probably make use of Chinese labour to take care of
Chinese outsourcing needs. This has led to Satyam and other Indian firms setting up
operations in China.
Let us step back and view this in more macro terms, considering what
multinationals’ experiences in China have been, and what the range of engagement
scenarios could look like.
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Lessons Learnt in Engaging China in the Past
Indian firms will have to recognise what many Western and Japanese
multinationals have learnt about operating China over the years. Some of these lessons
include:
— Engagement is better than avoidance.
— Long term presence is important to growing the base — this was certainly the
case with European car manufacturers such as Volkswagen which, unlike the
American auto companies, stuck with the Chinese market over the long term, and
have now achieved substantial branding and market share.
— Working with local partners is important — this has been true of any business, big
or small. The vagaries and difficulties of working with the wrong (unreliable)
partners is also evident, and dictates that potential partners be chosen wisely.
— There is always a danger of “knowledge seepage”, e.g. domestic firms walking
away with the knowledge gained through collaboration — this was what happened
with Japanese motorcycle makers, who have seen local imitators steal substantial
market share from them.
Engagement Strategies
At the broadest level of decision making, the quandary facing Indian firms can be
couched as a tough choice: to engage in China and face prospect of knowledge seepage
to potential future competitors (but also the prospect of continued collaboration), or to
avoid engagement and eventually face a competitor anyway (albeit perhaps a few years
later than otherwise).
These strategic options for dealing with China can be summarised in a simple
table that illustrates the likelihood of competition and co-operation in two different time
periods. The time periods stylistically represent two stages of capability development.
Inherent in scenario 2 is the possibility that China’s capability may catch up with India’s,
in which case there may be a decision to compete.
Table 8. India-China Engagement Strategies over Two Stages
Time period 1 / Time period 2 Compete Co-operate
Compete Scenario 1
Compete in time period 1
Compete in time period 2
Co-operate Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Co-operate in time period 1 Co-operate in time period 1
Compete in time period 2 Co-operate in time period 2
(with catching up) (with or without catching up)
Scenario 1: Engaging or Disengaging a Competitive Threat
One scenario is based on China’s current ambitions to move into the export
services market, where it would be competing directly with India. This was the original
concern within the Indian software industry.
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For now, however, China has focused on its strengths such as embedded
systems, and in software services for countries like Japan, where the natural similarity of
the written language may help Chinese to work better. Since Japan is not necessarily
India’s forte (Wipro’s significant inroads into Japan notwithstanding), the competitive
scenario is unlikely to be borne out soon on a large scale.
While India does have process capability and language facility that far outstrips
China’s, the degree to which India maintains its export prominence will probably rest on
the degree to which the evolution of India’s capabilities continues to stay ahead of
China’s advances in process and business practice.
Scenarios 2 and 3: Complementary Engagement Followed by More Co-operation
or Future Competition
In reality, because of the complexity of the Chinese and Indian industry’s
characteristics, engagement may take on the more complicated forms of scenarios 2
and 3, as opposed to the outcomes of scenario 1. Indian firms should recognise how to
play to their strengths in order to complement those in Chinese firms.
Scenario 2 arises when we consider the tendency for Chinese firms to focus on
the domestic product market, and that Chinese firms are seeking to leverage their
products with systems integration and other services.
For instance, Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software makers have to have
several things in place. Due to customers’ lack of sophistication, the success of the ERP
implementation depends strongly on consultants that can work with their customers to
implement their systems. Companies that failed did so because of the trouble caused in
inserting their software into older enterprises with traditional (top down) management
styles, thinking and employee behaviours. However, Chinese firms appear to have
insufficient consultants to be able to sell products to customers needing strong support.
India’s strengths in higher end services enhance the prospect of collaboration.
Indian firms might be able to work as partners on the services side with Chinese
companies that wish to focus on products. This would also help carry India’s firms more
easily into the various regions of China. Multinationals in China have not shown
themselves willing to venture far from the high value spectrum, or the packaged products
spectrum. In this regard, the combination of low cost Chinese programmers and low cost
Indian consultants could be a very potent force.
Invariably, Chinese firms will want a piece of the services pie, which would lend
credence to scenario 2 of future competition erupting in the services space, at least in
China. However, Indian firms are starting to show themselves quite adept at moving
within the consulting and systems space. Again, as in scenario 1, this will depend on
whether the gap between India and China in services and accompanying technologies
will widen or shrink. If Indian firms are able to maintain a comfortable lead in this area,
they may preserve the outcome of scenario 3, that is, encourage the Chinese firms to co-
operate.
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To facilitate this sort of complementary engagement, joint ventures may be
needed. Indian firms will have to work closely with Chinese partners to develop
consulting practices. In the end, the real answer to how successful Indian firms are in
China will probably rest on human factors: are Indians willing to relocate to China and
adapt themselves to the Chinese situation? Indian firms may also choose to go it alone,
but this runs into the difficult task of navigating the local politics and markets of each of
China’s provinces.
Scenario 4: India Learns from China
While many have been talking about how, in software, China can learn from India,
a fourth scenario might be that of India learning from the Chinese situation (not shown in
the table). The strength of Chinese policy towards research and innovation has allowed
Chinese companies to compete head to head with the US and other countries on Linux,
translation and even security software on their own home ground. India has not really
provided strong research support to its universities. The number of top Indian universities
may equal the number in China. However, without much funding, these universities have
become teaching institutions more than anything else, and the situation of graduate
students engaging in large research projects or Indian firms and/or the government
funding such research is probably not commonplace. The enactment of an appropriate
research policy requires a significant body of scientific advice, which Indian firms are
quite well positioned to give, given their connections to multinational partners and the
latest knowledge. Indian firms and their government will have to form a new basis for co-
operation. Joint university-industry-government research centres would be one such
model.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The Chinese software industry’s orientation is clearly substantially different from
India’s in that a number of companies are focused on making products for the domestic
market. The service companies are nowhere near as well developed as those of India,
as judged by several indicators of capability. Thus, the basic structure of China’s
software industry consists of a mixture of product firms (which also offer some mixture of
low- and high-end services), and low-end service firms.
It is clear that the Chinese domestic market (and therefore the industry) has some
advantages, such as the large and growing manufacturing, business and consumer
markets. The world market orientation of many manufacturing firms makes them
demanding users. Domestic market competition is keen, however, to the point where, as
standards, technologies and markets mature, there is likely to be a major shakeout of
firms in the coming years.
The competition from multinationals is especially strong in the packaged software
and high-end markets. Chinese firms’ advantage in competing with multinationals so far
has been in addressing the needs of small- and medium-sized enterprises, using a
mixture of services and products to provide for the latter’s needs.
The implications of these Chinese characteristics for India can range quite widely.
At one level, India can see China as a competitor, and at another, as a partner. This is
made more complicated when it is realised that the relative competitive advantages of
the two countries’ industries may change over time. Thus, co-operative or competitive
situations may remain as such, or a co-operative situation can turn competitive.
Whatever the case, the chances are that India will have to partner with Chinese firms in
order to get access to the Chinese market.
The competition scenario raises the spectre of the flight of Southeast and East
Asian manufacturing to cheaper Chinese shores (despite marked manufacturing process
improvements). This raises the question of whether software is yet another cost-based
industry where India could quickly lose comparative advantage.
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NOTES
1. NASSCOM presentation materials, 2002.
2. Another estimate of the domestic share of products puts it at 40 per cent (CSIA, 2000).
3. The study was based on interviews of 27 Chinese firms as well as national and provincial government
officials, and software associations.
4. The software product numbers are based on direct sales from retailers who only sell computer
software. This excludes bookshops, supermarkets and other outlets, in addition to original software
loaded onto manufacturers’ machines.
5. The high number in initial years may be due to data reporting issues.
6. Gartner estimates about 6.8 million SMEs, defined as companies with anywhere from one to
500 employees (Gartner, 2001).
7. This is based on shipments of 7.4 million units in 2001 for China, vs. about 1.8 million for India.
Nevertheless, India’s PC shipments grew three times faster than China’s in the same period (Gartner,
2002).
8. Far East Economic Review, 11 July 2002, p. 38.
9. The numbers for annual salaries are significantly lower than the hourly rates would suggest if they
were to be scaled up to annual salaries.
10. Typically, software involves a product lifecycle consisting of stages such as the following: requirement
analysis, high-level design, detailed (component) design, coding, integration and testing.
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